Playing the Other: the ethical limitations of playback performing.

By Nick Rowe

PO Box 714, New Paltz, NY 12561 USA
Tel: 845-255-8163 Fax: 845-255-1281 Email: playbackcentre@hvi.net
www.playbackcentre.org

Playing the Other: the ethical limitations of playback performing.

Nick Rowe

> *I have asked myself what I would do if, as a white, heterosexual, English, middle class man, I was cast as the teller's actor when the teller was, say, a black New York rapper, or a woman who is openly expressive around sexuality. Would it be possible for me to do justice to their stories? I ask this because I think I would feel uncomfortable and inadequate representing their experience. Of course it is immediately obvious that my choice of tellers exposes my cultural limitations, assumptions and even 'hang-ups'. Why did I choose those tellers in particular? I am sure that my choices tell you far more about me that they do about them. Nevertheless my dilemma does raise some issues that are critical for me as a playback actor.*
>
> *If cast in these roles how should I react? I could, of course, refuse saying that I am unable to play such a role convincingly - that would I think be a cop-out and what is more important it would be a serious misunderstanding of playback performing….*

In this article I will attempt to address the dilemma I have set myself above. I imagine that my questions are not unfamiliar to you: they go to the heart of the playback and bring into question the ethical responsibilities of the performer. The questions are raised: what are the limitations of the playback actor? Can we play a teller no matter how culturally unfamiliar to us? If we accept that our performances are always influenced by our culture and ideology then is it ethically acceptable for us to represent another? If it is ethically possible, then what might be some of the principles that would guide our performances?

These issues and questions are, of course, not new to the playback community. The March 1996 issue of Interplay (the newsletter of the International Playback Theatre Network) was a key one in marking a significant change in the development of playback with respect to issues of cultural diversity. With the subtitle 'What special education will white companies and actors need?' the movement seems to formally recognise for the first time the cultural limitations of the performer. More specifically Johnson asks,

> Where will white conductors get training in decoding the African-American schema and story so that actors can playback these stories with integrity? (1996 p.4)

It appears that, at least in this publication, the playback community was, for the first time, confronting the cultural limitations of the playback theatre. The notion of the 'authentic' actor able to respond to any story, no matter how culturally 'strange' was being brought into question. This is an important moment in the

development of playback theatre. For the first time they were asking: what are the limitations of playback acting? Can we assume that with good will and 'authenticity' an actor can take on any role no matter how culturally unfamiliar?

In order to get this question into focus it will be helpful to look at opposite sides of the debate. This will enable a clear view of the arguments for and against what we might call the possibility of the 'universal performer'. Although this may prove a useful strategy it will be important to recognise that few of us would take up a trenchant position on either side. In fact most playback practitioners, I suspect, would respond by saying "It depends" — on the context of the performance, the nature of the audience and their relationship with the performers, the experience and cultural sensitivity of the performers and so on. Nevertheless the debate might be said to lie between the 'organic approach' to acting on one side and, what I will call, the 'radical difference approach' one on the other. In other words, between those who consider that the performer can discover organic truths through her authentic encounter onstage and those who would argue that whatever is produced by the actor is always inflected by culture and ideology.

The 'organic approach'

There has been a thread running through dramatic theory and practice, certainly since Stanislavski, which Richard Drain (1995), in his anthology of twentieth-century theatre theory, terms the 'Inner Dimension'. The demand for the revelation of the actor's self on stage can be seen in the work of Artaud, Grotowski, Copeau, Brook and Julian Beck for example. In different ways these practitioners and theorists have sought to establish theatre practice which is wholly or largely based on the self-exploration of the performers. They have often contrasted their work with what they perceive to be a traditional or conventional theatre practice characterised by artifice, the subjection of the actor to the playwright or director, and the disappearance of the actor's self behind the role. Jerzy Grotowski, one of the most rigorous exponents of 'self revelation' in acting writes:

> When I say that the action must engage the whole personality of the actor […] it is a question of the very essence of the actor's calling, of a reaction on his part allowing him to reveal one after the other the different layers of his personality, from the biological-instinctive source via the channel of consciousness and thought, to that summit which is so difficult to define and in which all becomes unity. (1995 p.279-280)

Grotowski seems to be saying that there is, at the 'summit', a unified foundational self – a 'soul', perhaps – that becomes a 'gift' and 'a provocation' to the spectator. As Judith Butler might say, it is an 'epistemological paradigm that presumes the priority of the doer to the deed' (1990 p.148). It is the call for the 'pure' presence of the performer, which will enable transformative and authentic theatre (Auslander 1995).

This approach to acting is often apparent in playback discourse. For example Jo Salas writes:

> Playback acting requires a particular kind of acting which we can call *authentic* acting, as opposed to the more stylised acting familiar from television, film and most other kinds of theatre, however naturalistic. In playback acting, the actor does not use a code to depict emotion but draws her portrayal directly from her sense of the teller and the story. (Salas 1999 p.25)

And the IPTN describe the process in the following way:

> Authenticity in the spontaneous moment underlies Playback theatre practice. (IPTN 1999)

These descriptions of playback acting imply that the 'playing of the other' is not necessarily problematic. If the actor is 'authentic' and 'draws her portrayal from her sense of the teller and the story' then it is likely that the portrayal will be truthful to the radical difference of the teller. Phillip Auslander writes that the problem with these conceptions is that, without considerable nuancing, they

> …designate the actor's self as the *logos* of performance …and assume that the actor's self precedes and grounds her performance and that it is the presence of the self in performance that provides the audience with access to human truths. (Auslander 1995 p.60)

The question is: can we trust the actor's self to that degree, especially when it comes to playing another who is significantly different? It supposes a true, universal self beyond culture and language: a position that is difficult to sustain given the impact of the poststructuralist rejection of univocal truth and stable meaning.

The 'playback apologist' speaks

This concept of authenticity is one for which I have a great deal of sympathy. I am aware of many times in which I have felt that I have revealed something of myself in portraying the teller's story. Or at least, I have made use, for example, of my own experiences of depression, neurotic anxiety, loss or the joys of parenthood. I find myself in an uncomfortable position, since questioning these ideas of authenticity and self revelation expose me to the risk of 'losing my footing' as a playback performer. I confess to a fear that such an examination may lead me to destroy the beliefs that sustain me as an actor

and make playback theatre such an important part of my personal and professional life.

The 'radical difference approach'

This 'approach' comes from two main directions in order to critique the notion of the authentic actor who can depend on the 'truth' of the actors' experience. The first direction stresses the radical, idiosyncratic and ineffable difference of the 'other'. The second emphasises the inevitable cultural and ideological influences on all acting; this may be especially the case for improvised acting where, under pressure to do 'something', the dangers of slipping into cliché and stereotype are so present. I will look at each in turn.

The first critique of the 'organic' approach focuses on the risks of eradicating the other through representation. The feminist Hélène Cixous warns of the delights and dangers of identification. Elin Diamond explains:

> Cixous is describing the mimetic pleasures of identification – becoming or inhabiting the other on the stage or in spectatorial fantasy; I stand in for her, act in his place. Such acts are distinctly imperialistic and narcissistic: I lose nothing – there is no loss of self – rather I appropriate you, amplifying my 'I' into an authoritative 'we'. (1999 p.390)

Cixous's concern is that the consequences of identification are the denial of difference and distance. I force myself into the teller, engulfing the subtleties of his experience, erasing his identity and replacing it with my own. I possess him. My empathy precludes his otherness. Because the processes of identification are so intense in playback this danger is always present. The presence of the teller and the need for the actor to improvise may potentially collapse the psychic distance between performer and character and between teller and actor. Far from offering a viewpoint on the idiosyncrasy of the other, empathy may occlude it. Differences of gender, ethnicity and sexuality may be erased in this process of identification.

Cixous is not alone in her concerns; the point is compellingly made by bell hooks in a passage which could be read as a forceful and biting critique of playback.

> No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Rewriting you, I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still the coloniser, the speaking subject, and you are now in the centre of my talk.(1990 p.152)

A playback performance to delegates at a Conference in Eastbourne in May 2004 exemplifies these concerns. During the enactment of a story concerning the problems encountered by a man travelling by train with a disabled friend, an

actor represented the disabled man as passive and suggested through his speech and movement that he may also have a learning disability. In his feedback the teller said, “That was great except my friend was much more capable than you portrayed: he was, in fact, a lawyer”. This was a gross example of the dangers of playing the other. It highlights the risk that through stereotyping and presumption the idiosyncrasy of the other is appropriated and erased.

We cannot escape ideology and culture; we therefore cannot rely on the personal experience of the actor as a source of incontestable ‘truth’. Lauren Love puts it this way: ‘…representation is inextricably embedded in dominant ideology’ (1995 p.276). She encourages actors to resist acting practices which trust in the ‘truth of the actor’s experience’ — the most well-known of these being, of course, the ‘Method’ and asks the question: ‘Whose experiences can reflect any truths other than those of the culture in which they were raised?’ (p.277) From this position then, playback performers can do no other than reveal their cultural and ideological position in performances — the notion of the ‘universal performer’ is a fiction.

Brecht takes a slightly different tack and warns that identification will mask the socio-political circumstances of the drama. He writes:

> In order to produce A-effects the actor has to discard whatever means he has learnt of getting the audience to identify itself with the characters which he plays. Aiming not to put his audience into a trance, he must not go into a trance himself (….) Even if he plays a man possessed he must not seem to be possessed himself, *for how is the spectator to discover what possessed him if he does?* (1964 p.49) [my emphasis]

In this sense identification risks a mystifying ‘naturalness’ potentially suggesting that the circumstances of the protagonist could be no other, that they are immutable. As Brecht writes in his prologue to *The Exception and the Rule* , ‘We ask you expressly to discover/That what happens all the time is not natural’ (1930 p.110). The processes of identification and empathy which are so revered in the ‘organic approach’ are rejected here because they either eradicate the idiosyncrasy of the other, or mask the socio-political forces at work in all identification.

Performance as a way of deeply sensing the other.

Should these concerns leave us pessimistic about the possibilities of representing the other in playback? Must we see it always as a form of colonisation or possession? These issues have been considered by Dwight Conquergood in relation to his practice as an ethnographer of performance — a researcher and performer of cultural practices. While recognising that performances cannot take place in ‘ideological innocence’ (1985 p.2), he

wonders if they have the epistemological potential of '…deeply sensing the other' (a hopeful possibility for playback practitioners). In the remainder of this article I want to introduce Conquergood's mapping of different 'performative stances toward the other' and propose some ethical strategies that may reduce the dangers and worst excesses of 'playing the other'.

Conquergood identifies four performative stances toward the other which he considers 'immoral' (it is important, I think, that Conquergood is not afraid to use the unfashionable language of ethics here)

1. **The custodian's rip-off**: This is characterised by detachment and the plundering the experience of the other. In playback terms it could be considered as treating the stories of the other as trinkets to be collected and taken home. For Conquergood the immorality of such performances 'can be compared to theft and rape'(p.6).In terms of playback theatre this could be a company descending on a marginalised community and boasting of the stories it uncovers.

2. **The enthusiast's infatuation**: This leads to facile and over-eager identification with the other. It assumes that goodwill and enthusiasm are sufficient. Conquergood quotes Tzvetan Todorov to illustrate his point:

   > 'Can we really love someone if we know little or nothing of their identity, if we see, in place of that identity, a projection of ourselves or ideals' (In Conquergood 1985 p.6)

   The 'enthusiast' makes the assumption that their feelings of goodwill toward the other will overcome the problems of representing him. In playback terms it may be the belief that because I have experienced, say, bullying at school I can understand the systematic oppression of black people in the U.K. As Walter Benjamin argues, if we do so we will fail '…to touch the strangeness and the resistance of a reality genuinely different from our own' (in Conquergood 1985 p.7). This position is, for Conquergood immoral because it trivialises the other.

3. **The curator's exhibitionism**. Here Conquergood identifies the danger of making the culturally different exotic — of romanticizing the other in order to astonish the audience. He writes that:

   > The manifest sin …is Sensationalism, and it is an immoral stance because it dehumanises the other. (p.7)

4. **The sceptic's cop-out.** Finally the sceptic concludes that the chasm between the self and the other is so deep that there is no possibility of closing it. To Conquergood this is a morally reprehensible position because it 'forecloses dialogue'.

Towards and ethics of playback theatre

> One path to genuine understanding of others, and out of this moral morass and ethical minefield of performative plunder, superficial silliness, curiosity-seeking and nihilism, is dialogical performance…[T]he aim of dialogical performance is to bring self and other together so that they can question, debate and challenge one another. (Conquergood 1985 p.9)

> The teller is not asking that the actor get the story "right", for this is impossible, and implicitly understood by the teller. Rather, they are asking that the actor meet the spirit with which they themselves told their story. *The actor's attempt here is what is crucial - not the outcome*. (Penny 2002) [my emphasis]

I agree with Bacon when he writes: '…never has a sense of the other seemed more crucial for our own humanity'. When there seems so much wilful misunderstanding of the other it may well be that playback theatre offers one of those forums where the self and other can be brought together: a space as Jonathan Fox puts it for 'radical social encounter (1995 p.4). There is no doubt in my mind that playback theatre can offer such an encounter largely because audience members dare to tell their stories and actors dare to embody them. However, as we have already seen, there is always a risk that we will eradicate the difference of the other in our performances — that well-intentioned empathy becomes oppressive colonization of the other.

Before concluding I would like to offer some suggestions toward an 'ethical disposition' in relation to the other. It is my hope that this may begin a debate on how we might construct an ethics of playback theatre. I have deliberately chosen the word 'disposition' rather than 'principle' because it more accurately conveys the relational, active nature of the playback experience. I have drawn it from Richard Kearney for whom the question of ethics concerns the face-to-face 'disposition' toward the other. Ethics concerns how we are 'disposed' to the other, not a 'position' which is closed and non-relational, and as he writes:

> It is clear that this notion of the ethical subject as a dis-position before the face of the other is radically social and political in its implications. (in Read 1993 p.91)

As playback performers we cannot escape from ideology or from our own partiality. However, in my view, this is morally acceptable as long as we don't

claim to be doing more that is *humanly* possible (for me, capturing essences comes into this category) and that we recognise our agency and accountability. Christian Penny's statement that it is the '…actor's attempt that is crucial – not the outcome' seems to clearly express the point I am making. As a rule of thumb perhaps we should accept Anna Livia's advice: 'conjecture good, appropriation bad' (1996).

One might ask why we need an ethics of playback theatre. Maybe we should do what comes 'naturally' to us. Maybe as we have sometimes said in Playback Theatre York: we just need to be ourselves. But, as we have seen, what is natural is ideology and anyway, as Richard Kearney has pointed out, 'Ethics is against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my existence first' (in Read 1993 p.94). I would concur with Alan Read when he writes,

> An ethics of performance is an essential feature of any philosophy and practice of theatre. Without it a set of cultural practices which derive from a very specific arrangement of power relations between people are unhinged from responsibility to those people. (Read 1993 p.6)

What then might an ethical disposition toward playback performing look like? I would like to return the reader to the dilemma I posed at the opening of this article: am I able to play a teller whose cultural experience is significantly to my own? My thinking continues in the following way:

> *If I was to improvise one of these tellers I would have little to go on except for cultural stereotypes which, given the tellers' social position, would most likely be oppressive and insulting. So what am I to do? Well, of course, the first thing is that I would avoid the immediately obvious characterisations – just as I hope you would if you were to play a middle class English man! But then what? There is no point in denying difference: being black, from New York and into rap music, or being very sexually open is surely part of personal identity and to deny its importance would surely be a renunciation of a person's identity.*
>
> *My conclusion is that the answer to my dilemma must lie in two directions. Firstly, I must acknowledge and, as best as I can, represent the experience of the teller. There will be much of his or her experience with which I will be able to identify. For the teller, as much as for me if the roles were reversed, it will be important that I make an attempt and that I show him that I have listened to and understood his story. But there will always be a gap — or perhaps a chasm — between my portrayal and his experience. So what I need to do, I think, is keep the gap between me as the 'actor' and me as the 'character' open and represented. In other words, I must allow the limitations of my acting to be visible.*

My first recommendation for an ethical playing of the other could therefore be expressed as:

1. Make the process of representation visible

If we, as playback actors, dispense with the idea of authentic acting then we need to make the gap between self and other visible onstage. Our responsibility is to convey that the enactment is not the authoritative version of the story - that it is work in progress, that it is one interpretation of many that are possible. We have a responsibility to expose the processes of representation at work in the performance. In other words we might accept, along with Brecht (1964) and then Boal (Boal 1979), that the theatrical illusion must be punctured so that the spectators are aware of the provisional and mutable nature of reality.

To some extent I am arguing for the kind of acting that Brecht (1964) recommends in *The Street Scene*. The actor is not totally absorbed in empathic identification with the character but, to some extent, she is a 'demonstrator' who tells the story but maintains a visible gap between herself as performer and the character she is demonstrating. But how do we do this? These are some strategies that may help the performers 'enact' the inevitable gap between the actor and the character she is playing:

- use, like Brecht, the narrator role and so comment on the action from a rather more distanced position.
- as I have seen occasionally in Playback Theatre York, the teller's actor can *briefly* express — as a performer — the problems of representation she faces.
- the performers may choose to work with an extended metaphor which allows exploration of the story but avoids the problems of naturalistic portrayal.
- the teller's actor is careful not to give herself up to strong emotional identification.

In addition readers may be interested in looking at the advice Susan Evans and William Layman gave after staging a playback performance for the families and friends of fire-fighters following a forest fire in Washington State in July 2001 (Evans and Layman 2001 p.7). It provides wise guidance on the sensitive conduct of a very delicate performance.

2. Vulnerability: body awareness and mortality

In the conversations of Playback Theatre York there is one piece of advice which, like the wisdom of the tribe, is regularly repeated. It is that when you are feeling vulnerable and uncertain of yourself you are most likely to give a good performance. The company recognises, as I am sure many playback practitioners do, that the vulnerability of the performer is one of the factors that

permit lively and committed work. It seems that it is in the vulnerability and exposure of the body that a relational ethics may partly lie.

Terry Eagleton argues, in his search for what he calls a 'material morality' that :

> 'It is the mortal, fragile, suffering, ecstatic, needy, dependent, desirous, compassionate body which furnishes the basis of all moral thought'.

I am not suggesting here that the body provides a final and authoritative source for an ethics of playback. It would be wise not to fall back into the trap of recreating an 'essential' body. However, the material, mortal body may be a useful trope to construct such an ethics.

Terry Eagleton also argues for what he calls a 'materialist morality' located in the 'moral body' (2003 p.157). Taking Lear as his example, he writes:

> In the course of the drama, Lear will learn that it is preferable to be a modestly determinate 'something' than a vacuously global 'all'…. [This is because] he is forced up against the brute recalcitrance of Nature, which reminds him pitilessly of what all absolute power is likely to forget, namely that he has a body. Nature terrorizes him into finally embracing his own finitude. (2003 p.182)

Relinquishing the 'fantasy of disembodiment', Lear finally comes to recognise that when his subjects told him, 'I was everything; 'tis a lie – I am not ague-proof' (Act 4 Scene 6). Eagleton goes on to argue that, not only does the recognition of mortality allow us 'fellow-feeling'; it also acts as a brake to power. Wonderfully pithily he writes: 'If power had a body, it would be forced to abdicate'. (2003 p.183)

Fred Harris, a playback practitioner from the United States, proposes in a similar vein that, what he calls 'mortal awareness', is a key characteristic of effective playback performing. For Harris it is about being '…mindfully mortal: vulnerable to fate and destined to die, yet committed to life and its strivings.' He suggests that a performer who possesses such awareness helps 'us remember that our lives are limited and final, the actor helps us feel a renewed connection to life energy.' (Harris 2002)

3. Sensitivity to and keen awareness of difference

In searching for a contemporary ethics and politics of playback beyond 'the illusion of a universally binding ethic', Jutta Heppekausen writes:

> Playback Theatre is one of those practices that enable the complex possibility of real contact, real meeting to take place between people. In this, it

> represents a form of moral learning…The concept of 'morality' has been released from the illusion of a universally binding ethic (the Enlightenment, Kant etc), which also served to avoid real personal closeness through standardised social codes of interaction….Moral behaviour today is not (any longer) something that can be regulated by convention. The meetings, which occur between people, happen *face to face*; there is an emotional relationship. The Playback Theatre art form has the potential to approach this area in some quite specific ways - but with the attendant risks.(2003 p.3) [my emphasis]

She finds an ethics of playback in the acceptance and recognition of difference; the 'opening of a dialogue' through the recognition of the 'other'; and the acceptance of ambiguity and uncertainty. Her approach to playback eschews organised or codified formulations of ethical positions, instead preferring to stress the ethics that are called for in relationships with others.

This notion of the 'face-to-face' encounter as the ground of ethics comes from the work of the French philosopher, Emmanuel Lévinas (see Erickson 1999). Lévinas considered the other to be 'unknowable' and ungraspable. He suggests that this fact calls us to responsibility toward the other. Jon Erickson writes of Lévinas:

> Lévinas continually states the importance of the maintenance of separation between self and the Other as essential for maintaining the ethical relation; in particular he marks the separation that prevents one from seeking reciprocity with the Other, which could as some point easily dissolve into an illusion of a complete identification between the two parties. (1999 p.10)

Over-easy identification with the Other (Llewelyn 1995) is, as we have already seen, one of the dangers of representing in playback theatre. Lévinas calls for a sustained awareness of the irreducible otherness of the other. I think this principle needs to be in the mind of performers as they approach playing the other. Putting this another way: one could say that their work will always 'fail' because there is no chance of accurate representation.

4. The key role of the 'citizen actor' and the ensemble

Jonathan Fox asserts his belief in the 'citizen actor' who performs as needed and 'melts back into the social fabric', who 'voluntarily absorb[s] the pain and problems of others' and who offers 'Service without security, without fanfare, without adulation' (Fox 1994 p.214). This seems an important strategy that may permit performers to remain sensitive to difference. ensemble. Addionally, I would suggest that the robust life of a playback company is perhaps the best training ground for developing a heightened awareness to the otherness of the other.

5. Making the everyday extraordinary

Alan Read, in his consideration of the ethics of theatre, argues that theatre is '…a domain beyond everyday tyrannies to take better notice of the real pleasures of everyday life' (1993 p.36). As Conquergood did, he warns of the dangers of sensationalising the life and practices of the other. In an argument, which I think we can adopt for playback theatre, Read says, '…the critical task might not be to domesticate the exotic but to exoticise the domestic' (p.7)

In conclusion I have suggested that we need to question the notion of authentic acting since it is likely to mask the difference of the other. Instead I would suggest that all performance is a comprimise with the complexity of the other's difference. My suggestions for an ethics of playback theatre in this regard are intended to continue a debate that becomes more relevant as playback theatre extends beyond its roots in western affluent societies.

References

Auslander, P. (1995). 'Just Be Your Self'. *Acting (Re)Considered*. Zarrilla, P. (Ed). London and New York: Routledge.

Boal, A. (1979). *The Theatre of the Oppressed*. London: Pluto Press.

Brecht, B. (1930). 'Prologue to The Exception and the Rule'. *Twentieth Century Theatre*. Drain, R. (Ed). London: Routledge.

Brecht, B. (1964). 'The Street Scene'. *Performance Analysis.* Cousell, C. and Wolf, L. (Ed). London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1990). *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge.

Conquergood, D. (1985). 'Performing as a Moral Act: Ethical Dimensions of the Ethnography of Performance.' *Literature in Performance* 9(April).

Diamond, E. (1999). 'The Violence of "We": Politicizing Identification'. *Critical Theory and Performance*. Reinelt, J. and Roach, J. (Ed). Michigan: Ann Arbour University of Michigan Press: 390.

Drain, R., Ed. (1995). *Twentieth Century Theatre: a sourcebook*. London: Routledge.

Eagleton, T. (2003). *After Theory*. London: Allen Lane.

Erickson, J. (1999). 'The Face and the Possiblity of an Ethics of Performance.' *Journal of dramatic theory and criticism* 13(2): 5.

Evans, S. and Layman, W. (2001). 'A Playback Debriefing ... Some Lessons.' *Interplay* 7(2): This can also be found at: http://www.playbacknet.org/interplay/Previousissues/Dec01/Lessons.htm.

Fox, J. (1994). *Acts of Service: Spontaneity, Commitment, Tradition in the Nonscripted Theatre.* New Paltz: Tulsitalia Publishing.

Fox, J. (1995). 'Jonathan's Reply.' *Interplay* 6(1).

Grotowski, J. (1995). 'Methodological Exploration'. *Twentieth Century Theatre*. Drain, R. (Ed). London: Routledge.

Harris, F. (2002). 'Tragedy, Mortal Awareness and the Art of Playback.' *Interplay.* 7(3): (This may also be found at: http://www.playbacknet.org/interplay/Previousissues/March02/tragedy.htm).

Heppekausen, J. (2003). 'The Politics of Playback Theatre.' *Interplay* 8(2): This may be found at: http://www.playbacknet.org/interplay/Previousissues/December02/juttaenglish.htm.

hooks, b. (1990). *Yearning: race, gender and cultural politics.* Boston, MA: South End Press.

Johnson, J. (1996). 'Reaching for Diversity: Inclusion, Multiculturalism in Playback Theatre.' *Interplay* 6(3).

Kitzinger, C. and Wilkinson, S. (1996). *Representing the Other: a feminism and psychology reader*. London: Sage.

Llewelyn, J. (1995). *Emmanuel Lévinas: The Genealogy of Ethics*. London and New York: Routledge.

Love, L. (1995). 'Resisting the Organic'. *Acting (Re) Considered*. Zarrilla, P. (Ed). London New York: Routledge.

Penny, C. (2002). 'Acting in Playback Theatre
Walking on Stage with a Teller's Heart.' *Interplay* 8(1): This can also be found at: http://www.playbacknet.org/interplay/Previousissues/September02/penny.htm.

Read, A. (1993). *Theatre and Everyday Life*. London: Routledge.

Salas, J. (1999). 'What is "Good" Playback Theatre?' *Gathering Voices: essays in playback theatre*. Fox, J. and Dauber, H. (Ed). New Paltz: Tusitala.